Power system and natural gas (NG) system are two critical infrastructures (CI) that modern society depends on. The power system designed with conventional reliability criterion can neither effectively anticipate nor respond to high impact, low probability (HILP) events such as earthquake. At the same time, increasingly utilization of NG for electricity generation leads to rising intersystem coupling of power system and NG system. The interdependence imposes power system potential risk, such as failure propagation trigged by gas network contingency. Taken together with power system intrinsic complexity, these factors could operate to amplify disruptive effects. In this context, this paper aims to develop an effective model and approach to assess power system resilience considering associated fuel supply system based on two performance metrics: Expected Demand Not Supplied (EDNS) and Probability of Load Curtailments (PLC). It develops models of NG system, power system and their interdependence for quantitative measurement purpose, and generates an integral simulation frame using non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, it conducts case studies on modified Belgian gas transmission system and IEEE-24 reliability test system to justify the validity of the proposed approach.
Introduction
Our modern society depends deeply on critical infrastructure (CI) systems, which provide basic service for the society function and development, such as water, energy, health care, transportation, communication, and finance. The energy system especially power system and NG system is of vital importance since it supplies primary and second energy to all other sectors including itself for necessary operation. Power system is the backbone of several other key sectors. Blackouts in a power system could lead to disastrous consequences. Thus high reliability is the primary criteria of power supply to enable normal society function. However, threats to the power system reliability are both internal and external, such as threats from fuel supply system and extreme events.
The natural gas (NG) system is also a lifeline utility system playing a critical role in achieving social wellbeing. It is an essential energy source for activities of business, industry, agriculture and residents, especially an increasing fuel supply for power generation for a variety of reasons, such as technological advancements, environmental friendliness and economic profit. According to EIA's data, in 2014, 21.6% of world electricity production was from NG, the second largest preliminary single fuel, compared to about 12.1% in 1973 [7] . Obviously, the power system and NG system are linked more closely physically and economically, which could present challenges to both systems. The conventional viewpoint of treating NG or power system as a stand-alone energy supply is inadvisable. This highlights the necessity to model and analyse the interdependence between NG system and power system for risk mitigation and fast system restoration.
In addition to risks placed by interdependence among CIs, another challenge that power system faces comes from HILP events occurring more frequently in recent years, such as 2008 China ice storm [15] , 2011 Japan earthquake and 2011 Thailand floods. The impact from HILP events complicates the power system analysis process as they are extensive and significantly uncertain in scale, space and time. The diversity of physical impact mechanism on different CIs intensifies uncertainties further. What's more, HILP events are predicted to happen more frequently and intensely in the future [6] .
The CI internal complexity, rising interdependence as well as environmental risks resulting from HILP events could operate together to amplify disruptive effects. In this context, the resilience concept is emerging and has drawn much attention, and some work has been done sparsely across different fields, such as U.S, UK and "Future Resilient Systems" in Singapore-ETH Center [4] . However, in the process of power system resilience assessment, there is still a lack of consideration of this joint impact in a compatible way due to its complexity and interdisciplinary characteristics.
In order to address the issue, this paper aims to generate a preliminary integral analysis frame for power system performance assessment considering the impact of fuel supply systems under a wide range of uncertainties with an interdisciplinary viewpoint.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops system models and proposes approach used. Section 3 covers case studies and simulation results. Section 4 draws conclusions and proposes future work.
System modelling

NG system modelling
A NG system can be modelled as a directional graph made of nodes and components. Node is the terminal of one or more components or the point where the gas is injected in or extracted from the system. Node connecting component is the element that connects two nodes, such as pipeline and compressor.
The steady-state gas flow rate through a horizontal pipeline is governed by pressure drop along the pipeline, and can be expressed as [9, 11] :
where ij k M is the flow rate through pipeline k, SCF/hr; T0 is standard temperature, º R; π0 is standard pressure, psia; πi and πj are pressure of node i, j respectively, psia; Dk is the diameter of pipeline k, inch; fk is friction factor; G is gas specific gravity;
Lk is pipeline length, km; Tka is gas average temperature, º R; Za is gas compressibility factor; Sij=1 if πi>πj, else Sij= -1.
For a high-pressure NG network, Equation (1) can be rewritten as [14] :
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, and  is the pipeline efficiency.
The gas flow rate through a compressor is determined by its horsepower consumption that can be expressed by the following equation without heat transfer [9] :
where πi, and πj are the suction and discharge pressure respectively, psia; ij c M is the flow rate through compressor c, SCF/hr; ηc is compressor efficiency; αc is specific heat ratio (cp/cv, where cp is the heat capacity at constant pressure, cv is the heat capacity at constant volume).
The gas required by a gas-driven compressor c can be approximately calculated by:
where ,, The active power ij c L consumed by an electricity-driven compressor c can be calculated by [8] :
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For a NG network consists of n nodes and m components, node gas flow balance can be expressed as the algebraic sum of gas injected and extracted: 
Assume node n is the reference node with given node pressure while other n-1 node pressures are left unknown, and there are nc compressors with given compression ratio. Let column vector X represent the n-1+ nc unknown variables in the system:
where J is Jacobian matrix; ΔX is variable correction vector; l is number of iterations. 
By alternately solving Equation (10) and (11), the unknown variables can be determined. Substituting the results into Equation (2) and Equation (3), flow rates through pipelines and compressors can be calculated.
Contingencies in a gas network such as leak, explosion and component failure are not rare, especially under HILP events. Most of the time, a NG system can step into a new steady state through redispatch or adjustment without disturbance to end customers. However, in some cases, load curtailment is inevitable due to the operating constraints. In practical, optimal shedding strategies are developed with different objective, such as minimum cost, priority list or minimum load shedding, which is adopted in this paper. The optimal gas flow (OGF) is formulated as:
subject to Equation (2), Equation (3) and , min , max
min max
,max ,max (14), (16) and (17), the objective function (13) also subjects to:
,
where
To solve the modified optimization problem, an existed mixed integer programming solver SCIP (Solving Constraint Integer Programs) [1] is used.
Power system modelling
Determination of the most optimal state with given objective, such as minimum fuel cost or network loss, is the optimal power flow (OPF) problem.
The general mathematical formulation of OPF can be:
The equality constraint is the power flow constraint, while the inequality constraint includes generator generation bounds, voltage magnitude bounds, transmission line capacities, reactive power source bounds and so on.
The OPF problem can be solved by AC or DC power flow. For AC version, the state variable vector x is the voltage angles and magnitudes ungiven, generators' active and reactive generation. For DC version, it is the voltage angles and generators' active generation. In this paper, the DC OPF function in Matpower 6.0b1 is employed for its calculation efficient as Monte Carlo simulation will introduce a considerable amount of calculation with a large-scale system.
Interdependence modelling
The power system and NG system are physically linked bidirectionally through GFPGs and compressors driven by electricity. The active power consumed by a compressor is a function of its horsepower, which is presented by Equation(5). A GFPG acts as a gas consumer in the NG system. The NG mass flow it consumes can be calculated by the following equation [2] :
where i egl M is gas demand for electricity generation, SCF/hr; HR is heat rate, BTU/hr; GHV is gross heating value, BTU/SCF. The heat required for generation is a function of the active power generated by the GFPG, which can be formulated by:
where i g P is generated active power, MW; ,,
rate coefficients for GFPG; Фg is set of GFPG. The integrated simulation ( Figure 1 ) starts from an initial NG system state with known network topology, load demand and supply information. In every simulation round, the NG system operation state is generated randomly according to components' failure rate and repair time. Then, if the system is islanded, subsystems should be analysed one by one. For every island, if needed, the OGF would be run to calculate the load curtailment in order to determine the NG supplied to GFPGs. By the simulation end, probability distributions of NG supplied to GFPGs can be calculated.
Proposed approach
With simulation results of NG system, as well as given network topology and component data, power system simulation also starts from initial system state. The random system operation state is generated using non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation. If necessary, OPF would be run with the objective function of minimum load shedding. After completion of all simulations rounds, power system performance metrics can be calculated. It should be noticed the GFPG outage model is shifted from two states to multi states with the impact of associated NG supply system.
Case study
The analysed energy system consists of modified Belgian NG transmission system [3] and IEEE-24 reliability test system [12] . It is assumed that two 155 MW GFPGs are located at bus 15 and bus 16 in the power system, and the gas are supplied from node 12 (Namur) and node 20 (Petange) of the NG network, respectively, as shown in Figure 2 . The modified NG system includes 20 nodes and 24 pipelines described in Table 1 and Table 2 . Table 2 : Pipelines of Belgian gas transmission system
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In order to assess the effect of fuel supply system, the following two scenarios are simulated for comparison: independent power system, the power system with integration of associated NG system. Two power system performance metrics are employed: the Expected Demand Not Supplied (EDNS) and Probability of Load Curtailments (PLC).
In the independent scenario, the power system is simulated under the assumption that the NG system is 100% reliable. All generators are modelled by two states. In the integrated scenario, the GFPGs outputs and corresponding probabilities are determined by the NG system and power system together. In this paper, it is assumed that the active power generated by a GFPG has a linear relationship with NG input [13] . 
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where µp is repair rate of the pipeline, repairs/year; Up is the pipeline unavailability. Table 4 : NG network simulation result
The simulation result demonstrates that contingencies in NG system could result in a cut-off or reduction of gas supplied to GFPGs with relatively higher probabilities. The probabilities of NG disruption at node 12 and 20 are 0.924242424 and 0.811818182 respectively, both the highest one. The probability of reduced NG supply at node 12 is as high as 0.064545454, which is almost six times of 100% NG supply.
When considering the fuel supply impact, the GFPGs are more likely to trip or operate in derated states compared to 100% reliable fuel supply. Table 5 : GFPG output and probability It can be seen clearly that in combined scenario the probability of success state at full capacity 155 is decreased while the failure probability is increased significantly in comparison with the independent scenario. Further, it is more obvious for the GFPG at bus 16. The reason is that its fuel is supplied by node 20 in the NG system, which has much longer distance from main NG sources. In other words, in the NG system, node 20 is more vulnerable to contingencies than node 12, which is determined by the network topology. The effect placed by the NG system lead to reduced system performance, which can be displayed by significant increase of EDNS and PLC. ENDS increases sharply by 41.2856% from 14.5857 MW to 20.6075 MW, while PLC increases by 33.3529% from 0.08527 to 0.11371 as shown in Figure 3 . This result can be easily explained. In the combined scenario, increased GFPG failure probabilities in turn increase the probability of the power system load curtailment. The increase is more obvious if large capacity GFPGs are connected to topology weak NG system. The system ENDS also becomes larger due to increased failure probabilities and decreased outputs.
Simulation results reveal two key insights: first, the interdependence impact is significant and should not be ignored; second, the interdependence worsens power system performance. Therefore, the power system becomes less resilient considering fuel supply system. Neglecting this factors in the resilience assessment of power systems would result in the underestimation of the problem.
Conclusion and future work
Although there is still debates around the power system resilience definition and assessment approach, it becomes a hot topic and has vital importance as an integral part of society preparedness for HILP events.
Against this background, this paper provides a preliminary method for power system performance assessment considering the impact of fuel supply systems. Conclusions can be drawn from the simulation results analysis. First, obtained results show that the interdependence among the power system and NG system plays an important role in the performance of power system. Second, contingencies in NG system have a high, non-negligible, negative impact on power system performance. It can be easily observed from the perspective of EDNS and PLC. The simulation results also verified the effectiveness of approach developed in this paper.
Although the suggested method enhances the understanding of the role of significant interdependence, there are several questions remaining unclear. In order to fully explore this topic, additional efforts are required in the future.
First, physical models of impact mechanism must be developed for different types of HILP events to different kinds of CI components. For this purpose, information form the geographical information system and meteorological system would be integrated.
Second, although general resilience metrics are available, they are not sufficiently valid predictors. Individual metrics must be developed according to the threat and system characteristics. It should be shifted towards multi-attributed quantification including of restoration process.
Third, cascading effects will be taken into account because interdependence among CIs makes the power system more vulnerable to cascading failures under HILP events as disruption in one system could propagate to the other.
Moreover, human factor will be included, such as operator behaviour, which plays a vital role in an emergency.
